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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
THE STATE OF UTAH : 
Plaintiff7Appellee : 
v. : 
DARRILL GORDY : Case No. 20000661 -C A 
Priority No. 2 
Defendant/Appellant : 
THE TRIAL COURT VIOLATED MR. GORDY'S RIGHT 
TO DUE PROCESS OF LAW BY ADMITTING AN 
UNRELIABLE EYEWITNESS IDENTIFICATION 
This case involves a robbery in which Ms. Gaffney, the eyewitness (1) observed 
the assailant only a few short seconds while a loud alarm sounded; (2) focused her 
attention on maintaining her balance and escaping; (3) suffered a high level of fear and a 
significant visual impairment; (4) could not accurately describe the assailant's clothing 
and identified Mr. Gordy at a suggestive-show-up; and, (5) was a different race than Mr. 
Gordy. Under these circumstances, the eyewitness identification was constitutionally 
unreliable. The trial judge shirked his constitutional duty to exclude this evidence by 
concluding that an expert witness would explain the limitations in Ms. Gaffney's 
identification. Because this case presents a significant question of constitutional law and 
concerns the trial judge's gatekeeping responsibilities, Mr. Gordy requests this Court to 
convene an oral argument and to reverse his convictions. 
A. The Eyewitness Identification was Unreliable 
The factors for determining the reliability of eyewitness identifications in State v. 
Ramirez. 817 P.2d 774, 781 (Utah 1991), all require suppressing Ms. Gaffney's 
identification. First, Ms. Gaffney had only one brief opportunity to view the assailant 
when she saw him turn around and face her in her living room. At all other times during 
the encounter, Ms. Gaffney was either fighting with the intruder, keeping her balance, or 
trying to flee. And, despite the State's attempts to minimize the distraction of the burglar 
alarm, Ms. Gaffney agreed that the alarm was "obnoxious" R. 255: 120. 
The State attempts to cloud the facts by arguing that Ms. Gaffney did not admit to 
being distracted as the assailant pushed her backwards down the hallway. State's Brief at 
11 n.6. Instead, the State argues that she only admitted at the second trial that she could 
not tell whether the attacker was intoxicated. Id. To the contrary, Ms. Gaffney admitted 
at both the preliminary hearing and at the first trial that she did not pay attention to the 
man in the hallway. R. 251: 142. In any event, Ms. Gaffney's testimony at the second 
trial had no bearing on the decision to admit her identification testimony. Moreover, the 
State mischaracterizes Ms. Gaffney's testimony at the second trial. Ms. Gaffney agreed 
with her preliminary hearing testimony that because she was primarily concerned for her 
safety and keeping her balance she did not pay attention to the intruder and could not tell 
if he were inebriated. R. 255: 123. Thus, Mr. Gordy accurately represents that Ms. 
Gaffney had little opportunity to identify the attacker as she was being pushed down the 
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hallway. 
Second, Ms. Gaffney focused her "attention" on protecting herself and escaping, 
not on identifying the assailant. Ramirez, 817 P.2d at 783. From the time the intruder 
began to shove her and demand money, Ms. Gaffney riveted her attention on avoiding 
injury and fleeing the situation. 
Third, Ms. Gaffney's "capacity to observe" the intruder was seriously impaired. 
Ramirez, 817 P.2d at 783. The State's claim that Ms. Gaffney was only fearful after the 
incident lacks credulity. State's Brief at 13. An elderly woman seeing a strange man 
break into her home and having the stranger violently push her backwards while 
repeatedly screaming, "Money, bitch!" would certainly cause the woman to experience a 
high level of shock and fear. 
The State similarly attempts to downplay Ms. Gaffney's visual impairment. 
Again, the State relies largely on Ms. Gaffney's testimony at the second trial which 
played no role in the decision to admit her identification testimony. State's Brief at 13. 
Ms. Gaffiiey only testified at the first trial that she could clearly see the assailant standing 
in her living room from 20 feet away without her glasses. R. 251: 117. But, she added 
that without her glasses she cannot read books at all and she even has to "get down on my 
knees" to read price tags at the grocery store. R. 251: 140. Although not a factor in the 
decision to admit her testimony, Ms. Gaffney later testified confusingly at the second trial 
about her visual impairment. She claimed to be able to see faces from two or three feet 
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awray, but she also asserted that "up close I'm practically blind." R. 255: 96-97. Plainly, 
Ms. Gaffney had a significant visual impairment when seeing things within a few feet 
away. 
The evidence establishes that Ms. Gaffney saw the assailant outside the range of 
her visual impairment only once briefly as he stood in her living room. As the State 
concedes, at all other times, Ms. Gaffney viewed her attacker without her glasses well 
within the range of her visual defect. R. 251: 139-41; State's Brief at 7. These 
observations include her show-up identification. Given Ms. Gafftiey's visual problems, 
the reliability of her identification is doubtful. 
Fourth, errors in Ms. Gafftiey's description of the assailant and the problems with 
a suggestive identification procedure plague Ms. Gafftiey's identification. The record 
unequivocally establishes that Ms. Gaffney described the intruder as wearing a plaid shirt 
in contrast to Mr. Gordy's solid-colored shirt. The State simply conjectures when it 
attempts to attribute this false description to Ms. Gafftiey's purported "idiosyncratic use 
of language." State's Brief at 16. This unsupported characterization grasps at straws. 
Regardless of how the State portrays the show-up identification, it is well-
established that such identification procedures are ffblatant[ly] suggestive[]." Ramirez, 
817 P.2d at 784. Moreover, once Ms. Gaffney identified Mr. Gordy, all subsequent 
identifications were tainted. 
Fifth, Ms. Gaffney was a different race than the assailant. Again, the State tries to 
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whitewash this fact by noting that Ms. Gaffhey had a couple of African-American 
relatives and that she had several friends who were African-American. The State presents 
no research to show Ms. Gaffney's exposure to African-Americans was sufficient to 
improve her ability to identify her attacker. The fact remains that she identified a person 
of a different race. 
Contrary to the State's claims, this case does not present a stronger case for 
admitting an eyewitness identification than in Ramirez. Determining whether an 
eyewitness identification is constitutionally reliable is a fact-specific inquiry that may not 
necessarily translate well to other circumstances. In any event, several factors in Ramirez 
not found in this case supported admitting the identification. The eyewitness in that case 
saw the defendant for as much as a minute or longer rather than a couple of seconds as 
here. Ramirez, 817 P.2d at 782. The eyewitness there stared at the assailant in an effort 
to later identify him, which did not occur here. Id at 783. Further, because the 
assailant's face was covered in Ramirez, the cross-racial problem was not at issue. IdL at 
784. This case also involved the added problems of the loud burglar alram, Ms. 
Gaffney's extreme fear and focus on her safety, and her uncorrected visual impairments. 
Under these facts, Ms. Gaffney's identification was unreliable. 
The numerous weaknesses in Ms. Gaffney's identification required suppression. 
As the Utah Supreme Court has repeatedly held, "research has convincingly demonstrated 
the weaknesses inherent in eyewitness identification." State v. Maestas. 1999 UT 32, 
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J^27, 984 P.2d 376. The trial judge should have kept Ms. Gaffney's testimony from the 
jury because "jurors do not appreciate the fallibility of such identifications [and] they 
often give eyewitness testimony undue weight." Id. at [^26. Such was the case here. 
B. The Trial Judge Failed to Enter Adequate 
Findings and in doing so He Shirked His Duty 
to Determine the Constitutional Reliability of 
the Eyewitness Identification 
The circumstances surrounding Ms. Gaffney's identification also fail to support 
the trial judge's findings. The State concedes that there was no evidence showing that the 
assailant "slowly" pushed Ms. Gaffney and that the trial judge erred in considering the 
certainty of Ms. Gaffney's identification. State's Brief at 20. But, contrary to the State's 
characterization, these errors were not "trivial" or "irrelevant." Id. at 20-21. Rather, the 
trial judge's view of the rate at which the assailant pushed Ms. Gaffney and her certainty 
of her identification go directly to the heart of the reliability of the identification. The 
speed of the pushing addresses the length of time Ms. Gaffney observed the assailant and 
whether she had an adequate opportunity to view him. Likewise, crediting Ms. Gaffney 
for being certain demonstrates that the judge did not appreciate the limitations of 
eyewitness identification and that he overvalued Ms. Gaffney's opinion. The trial judge's 
false perceptions of the facts appears to have affected his view of the quality and quantity 
of Ms. Gaffney's observations. 
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The State agrees that the trial judge speculated about Mr. Gordy changing shirts 
but dismisses the judge's reasoning as something less than a "formal finding of fact.11 
State's Brief at 21. Regardless of the characterization of the judge's statement, his view 
of the discrepancy in clothing significantly affected his decision. The State had a large 
gap in this case: the assailant wore a plaid shirt not a solid-colored one like Mr. Gordy 
wore. To say that the trial judge's rationalization about changing shirts did not affect the 
trial judge's decision, defies reason. The trial judge perceived a looming gap in the 
State's case and filled it with speculation despite the absence of any support for his view. 
In addition to these "legally insufficient" findings, the trial judge erred in 
concluding that Ms. Gaffney had an adequate opportunity to view the assailant. State v. 
Decorso. 1999 UT 57, fU , 993 P.2d 837, cert, denied 528 U.S. 1164 (2000). As shown 
above, Ms. Gaffney had one, brief opportunity to view the assailant outside the range of 
her visual defect and without her being distracted. 
The State asserts that this Court can reasonably assume that the trial judge made 
adequate findings even though he failed to acknowledge the limitations of Ms. Gaffney's 
testimony. State's Brief at 21-22. But, findings are inadequate if "the ambiguity of the 
facts makes this assumption unreasonable[.]" Ramirez, 817 P.2d at 788; State v. 
Robertson, 932 P.2d 1219, 1234 (Utah 1997). The trial judge's failure to even 
acknowledge the significant problems with Ms. Gaffney's testimony created ambiguity 
concerning whether he actually weighed those problems. 
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Judges must make sufficient findings on the record to "enable a reviewing court to 
accurately determine the basis for the trial court's decision." State v. Hodges. 798 P.2d 
270, 274 (Utah Ct. App. 1990). Findings are particularly vital in fact-intensive situations 
such as here "'to enable this [Cjourt to meaningfully review the issues on appeal.'" State 
v. Lopez. 873 P.2d 1127, 1130 (Utah 1994) (quoting State v. Lovegren. 798 P.2d 767, 
770 (Utah Ct. App. 1990)). In fact-intensive cases, the "lack of meaningful findings 
necessitates remand unless the undisputed facts of record compel but one conclusion." 
State v. Vigil. 815 P.2d 1296, 1301 (Utah Ct. App. 1991). Given the strength of the 
evidence favoring the unreliability of the eyewitness identification, the trial judge's 
findings were grossly inadequate. 
Finally, the trial judge abdicated his responsibility to rule on the constitutionality 
of the evidence when he rationalized that the expert witness would explain the limitations 
of the identification testimony to the jury. Trial judges must carefully assess the 
reliability of eyewitness identifications rather than deferring this legal determination to 
the jury: 
Because the jury is not bound by the judge's preliminary factual 
determination made in ruling on admissibility, the trial court 
may be tempted to abdicate its charge as gatekeeper to carefully 
scrutinize proffered evidence for constitutional defects and may 
simply admit the evidence, leaving all questions pertinent to its 
reliability to the jury. But courts cannot properly sidestep their 
responsibility to perform the required constitutional 
admissibility analysis. To do so would leave protection of 
constitutional rights to the whim of a jury and would abandon 
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the courts' responsibility to apply the law. Cf. State v. 
Rimmasch. 775 P.2d 388,397-99 (Utah 1989) (discussing need 
for threshold reliability examination by trial court prior to 
admission of scientific evidence, even though jury will 
ultimately determine weight). The danger of such an abdication 
of responsibility is particularly serious where the admissibility 
of an eyewitness identification is concerned because of the 
probability that such evidence even though thoroughly 
discredited has a powerful effect on a jury. See State v. Long, 
721 P.2d 483,490 (Utah 1986). 
Ramirez. 817 P.2d at 778-79. 
Just like letting the jury sort out the problems of eyewitness identification, the trial 
judge here let the expert educate the jury and then left the protection of Mr. Gordy's 
"constitutional rights to the whim1' of the jury. Id. at 778. The trial judge's abdication of 
his gate-keeping role violated Mr. Gordy's right to due process of law. 
C. The Absence of Corroborating Evidence 
Requires Reversal 
The erroneous admission of the eyewitness identification testimony requires 
reversal. The State has the burden of showing that the deprivation of a constitutional 
right did not harm Mr. Gordy beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Jaeger, 1999 UT 1, 
}^30, 973 P.2d 404. Even the State concedes that absent Ms. Gaffney's identification the 
evidence is insufficient evidence to sustain Mr. Gordy's conviction. State's Brief at 23 
n.7. Indeed, absent her testimony there is no evidence linking Mr. Gordy to the crime 
scene. Specifically, there was nothing found in Mr. Gordy's duffel bag that was taken 
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from the house. Further, the police recovered no fingerprints. Although the State implied 
at trial that Mr. Gordy used the screwdriver and gloves found in the bag to break into the 
house, Ms. Gaffhey testified that the assailant had nothing in his possession during the 
robbery or as he fled. There is simply a complete absence of evidence to tie Mr. Gordy to 
the crime absent the unreliable identification. 
Under these circumstances, the State cannot meet its burden of proving 
harmlessness. At most the State can show that Mr. Gordy resembled the assailant, he was 
near the scene of a crime, and he gave somewhat inconsistent statements about his recent 
activities. But, as even the State concedes, this circumstantial evidence is "insufficient1' 
to support the convictions. State's Brief at 23 n.7. Without something connecting Mr. 
Gordy to the crime scene, the conviction fails. 
D. Oral Argument Would Assist this Court in 
Deciding the Several Legal Issues Presented on 
Appeal 
Given the difficult legal issues presented in this appeal, this Court should schedule 
this case for oral argument. Utah Rule of Appellate Procedure 29 appears to assume that 
this Court will conduct oral arguments unless certain conditions apply. For purposes of 
this appeal, oral argument would only be unnecessary if "the decisional process would not 
be significantly aided by oral argument." Utah R. App. Proc. 29(a)(3). 
Given the parties' contrasting views of the evidence and the numerous legal issues 
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presented on appeal, oral argument would assist this Court's decision-making. Although 
the facts are essentially undisputed, Mr. Gordy views those facts much differently than 
the State. Oral argument would also assist this Court in deciding whether the State met 
its burden of proving harmlessness. At a court hearing, this Court could question the 
parties about the strengths and weaknesses of their respective positions. 
This appeal further addresses thorny legal questions that may require some 
discussion at a court proceeding. These issues include the trial court's duty to enter 
finding of facts and the sufficiency of the findings in this case. This Court must also 
decide whether the trial judge shirked his gate-keeping role in assessing the 
constitutionality of Ms. Gaffney's eyewitness identification testimony. Because these 
issues are fact-specific, oral argument may be particularly beneficial in applying the law 
to the facts. It would also ensure that this Court can explore all possible remedies. 
CONCLUSION 
Because the trial judge admitted unreliable eyewitness testimony that was the sole 
evidence linking Mr. Gordy to the crime, reversal is required. 
SUBMITTED this ^  day of September, 2001. 
KENT R. HART 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
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